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Abstract: Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers future proof security based on fundamental laws
of physics. Long-distance QKD spanning regions such as the United Kingdom (UK) may employ a
constellation of satellites. Small satellites, CubeSats in particular, in low Earth orbit are a relatively
low-cost alternative to traditional, large platforms. They allow the deployment of a large number of
spacecrafts, ensuring greater coverage and mitigating some of the risk associated with availability
due to cloud cover. We present our mission analysis showing how a constellation comprising 15
low-cost 6U CubeSats can be used to form a secure communication backbone for ground-based and
metropolitan networks across the UK. We have estimated the monthly key rates at 43 sites across the
UK, incorporating local meteorological data, atmospheric channel modelling and orbital parameters.
We have optimized the constellation topology for rapid revisit and thus low-latency key distribution.
Keywords: SatQKD; CubeSats; satellite constellations.
1. Introduction
Encryption is vital for securing the transmission of personal, commercial and governmental
data. The rapid development of quantum computation threatens the underpinnings of current public
key cryptographic methods, most notably the RSA (Rivest–Shamir–Adelmann) cryptosystem [1],
that are the basis of the internet. Hence, there is the need for the development of “quantum-safe”
communication methods that can provide forward security for critical information. We also note the
development of “post-quantum cryptography” [2] that seeks replacement public key algorithms that
are resistant to attack by quantum and classical computers. Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been
proposed as a solution that allows two distant parties—traditionally named Alice and Bob—to establish
a joint secret key of which the security is dependent not on computational complexity assumptions
but on the laws of quantum physics. There has been significant effort toward its theoretical and
experimental development [3–6] over more than three decades, with commercial fibre-based systems
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now commercially available. However, fibre losses scale exponentially with distance, greatly restricting
the range of terrestrial QKD. Conventional optical repeaters cannot be used with QKD [7–9] since
quantum information cannot be perfectly and deterministically copied [10–12] and practical quantum
memories are still a long-term prospect. Satellites are currently the only viable option for extending
QKD communication ranges beyond distances greater than a few hundred kilometers [13–17] and thus
for enabling the global quantum internet [18].
In this article, we present an overview of the quantum research CubeSat (QUARC) space
mission and evaluate the feasibility of providing a secure satellite quantum key distribution (SatQKD)
service to the UK via a constellation of CubeSats. Another recent work on satellite constellations
for QKD networks but with different aims can be found in Reference [19]. Recently, Satellite
quantum communication has witnessed an unprecedented growth including proof-of-principle
experiments [20–26], quantum mechanics fundamental tests [27,28], and the launch and operation
of a QKD satellite [29–31]. These groundbreaking results have spurred an international space race
involving university consortia, national agencies and private companies, e.g., QKDSat (ArQit) [32],
QUARTZ (SES) [33], QEYSSAT (Canada) [34], UK–Singapore Bilateral (RAL Space—CQT) [35],
QUBE (Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt (DLR) + German Universities) [36], NANOBOB
(Austria–France) [37] and IOD-6/ROKS (UK) [38]. Many of these efforts focus on satellites belonging
to the domain of large and complex platforms, and little research has been carried out so far regarding
QKD performance evaluation using smaller satellites. On the other hand, Small Satellites (SmallSats)
and especially the popular CubeSat standard have been in the spotlight for their potential to deliver
meaningful communication volumes at a significantly reduced price and complexity. Operationally,
they represent a path finder option for the deployment of large constellations offering rapid revisit
and therefore greater coverage than a single large spacecraft [39,40].
The objective of the QUARC space mission is to provide a QKD service to a specific region:
the UK. We identify relationships between satellite constellation topology, the atmospheric channel
and historical weather data and estimate key rates over 43 ground stations (gateways) uniformly
distributed across the UK (Figure 1) serviced by a constellation of 15 satellites. These gateway locations
cannot be connected currently via the installed fiber network, and they have been defined specifically in
order to gain an understanding of how communication performance varies across different regions at
different times throughout the year. The aim is not to satisfy a particular revisit/coverage requirement
but to offer a generalised performance metric from which performance can be scaled by the number
and location of gateways and by the number and distribution of satellites in the constellation. More
satellites result in a greater level of expected coverage and secure key, while more gateways result
in a higher probability of contact being made and a smaller amount of key data being received at
each individual gateway. Here, we have chosen not to focus on the key management and scheduling
problems but we refer the reader to recent works on these topics [41,42].
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Figure 1. Distribution of 43 hypothetical gateways (red dots) distributed across the UK region.
The number of keys that can be distributed between the constellation and each gateway
throughout the year is evaluated via simulation that incorporates effects from cloud cover,
sunrise/sunset, and various sources of losses and spurious counts in order to consider the impact of
the changing seasons and latitude. The best case scenario is found to be represented by the southeast
England gateway where ∼ 300 kbit/night/satellite of key can be exchanged during August, while the
worst case is represented by the northeast islands of Scotland, where no key can be distributed; this is
due to the constraint of nighttime operations that we have assumed for the purposes of the analysis.
We assume a conservative level of system performance and that daytime background light would
result in excessive spurious counts, curtailing operations. We also conservatively assume that QKD
operations are not possible in twilight or dusk conditions. In practice, some nonzero key rates may be
possible with small levels of background light and a more detailed simulation incorporating site-level
background light and astronomical data, e.g., position of the moon, is in development. SatQKD
systems that can operate in daytime are currently under development by various groups [43–46] but
not yet fully demonstrated in orbit. On the other hand, when the constellation is required to distribute
keys not only to a single gateway but also to all gateways, the best case scenario secret key volume
decreases to 160 kbit/night/satellite, which is also in southeast England. Our results indicate that
a CubeSat constellation has the potential to deliver a meaningful amount of secret key for scenarios
requiring small-volume, highly secure communication via quantum-resistant symmetric key ciphers
like Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [47]. We have also carried out preliminary system design
and tests of the payload acquisition, pointing and tracking (APT) system, which is a vital subsystem
for long-distance free-space QKD; these will be detailed in a separate paper.
The rest of this work is structured as follows: In Section 2, we outline the payload design, in
particular the acquisition pointing and tracking system. In Section 3, we describe the model for the
quantum channel. In Section 4, we present the mission design and discuss the orbital choice for the
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satellite constellation. In Section 5, we model the key exchange between the constellation and the set
of gateways. Section 6 is devoted to the presentation of the mission performance. Finally, this paper
concludes with Section 7.
2. Payload Design and System Outline
This section gives a brief description of the QKD payload and subsystems used in the mission
analysis. A concept outline for the 6U CubeSat is shown in Figure 2. Such a payload has similarity
to free-space optical communication payloads in development for nanosatellite missions [36,37,48]
and handheld devices [49,50]. SatQKD can be divided into two main types: untrusted and trusted
node [13]. Untrusted node SatQKD ensures verifiable security between two grounds stations via
Bell test measurements without any assumption of the security of the satellite itself. This requires
simultaneous links between the satellite and the two ground stations, difficult to achieve with high key
rates. On the other hand, the trusted node paradigm assumes the satellite to be outside the domain
of influence of an eavesdropper. For near-term realisation of SatQKD, the trusted node scenario
is thus the most feasible. Trusted node SatQKD can be realised using the spacecraft as a receiver
(uplink (UL) configuration) or as a transmitter (downlink (DL) configuration). A DL configuration
requires the development of a space-qualified optical assembly for precise pointing of the order of
few µrad and quantum sources driven by quantum random number generators [39,40]. The UL
configuration requires a less complicated payload comprising single photon detectors but would
also require a larger telescope compared to DL [37,48]. However, in this configuration, the upward
beam encounters turbulence early during its path, leading to larger path deviations (the so-called
shower curtain effect) and therefore higher losses, on the order of 20 dB greater with respect to the DL
configuration [13,17,51,52]. In this work, we therefore focus attention on the DL scenario.
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Figure 2. Layout of 6U CubeSat: Approximately 3U (2.5 litres) of volume is reserved for the platform
systems including the electrical power system (EPS), communications (COMMS), on-board computer
(OBC) and attitude determination and control system (ADCS). The ADCS incorporates a star tracker
(shown separately) to provide sub-0.25◦ coarse pointing and is located on the opposite face to the
transmission aperture. The transmission telescope occupies 1U, the source and APT system occupy
1.5U and the payload electronics occupy 0.5U. An S-band antenna is located on the same face as the
transmission telescope to allow high-speed radio frequency (RF) communications during the QKD
pass for real-time data post-processing. The satellite bus would also include deployable solar panels to
recharge on-board batteries that would provide sufficient power for repeated QKD operations during
the eclipse phase of the orbit. Appropriate 6U CubeSat buses are available from commercial providers
such as Blue Canyon Technologies (www.bluecanyontech.com), Endurosat (www.endurosat.com),
GomSpace (gomspace.com), Innovative Solutions In Space (www.isispace.nl) and AAC Clyde Space
(www.aac-clyde.space).
Quantum Source: QKD requires the ability to send extremely faint pulses of light at a high repetition
rate and with a polarization randomly selected from a set of non-orthogonal signal states. This can
be achieved by combining multiple differently polarized sources or by modulating the polarization
of a single source. Currently, we plan to use multiple polarized LEDs (extinction 1000:1) combined
with a single-mode fibre to remove spatial information. LEDs have a wide spectrum, and therefore
with appropriate filtering, they are resilient to mismatches in wavelengths between the LEDs. Recent
advances in integrated optics could also be leveraged using interferometers to modulate light and
2D grating couplers to generate the polarization states from a single source [53]. An integrated
platform would be smaller but would require additional hardware to monitor the output. Such
sources have been previously developed with small size, weight and power (SWaP) envelopes of the
orders of 10−4m3, 10−1 kg and < 1 W. They can be made to be monolithic, solid-state devices with
further miniaturisation possible through integrated optics fabrication [54,55]; hence, the source can
be accommodated in 1U. The main issues will be wavelength matching between different emitters to
prevent side-channel leakage, modest temperature stability and reliability in the space environment;
the latter is still to be proven [56].
For the source wavelength, we have chosen 808 nm for ease of laser diode selection, atmospheric
transmission and low background light during night operations due to atmospheric scattering of
moonlight and OH recombination in the upper atmosphere [57]. We assume a pulse repetition rate
of 100 MHz, comparable with QUESS/Micius [29]) and quite modest compared to what is currently
achievable in fiber [58].
An important aspect of such a source is a supply of truly random and securely generated bits. For
a 2-Decoy State Protocol, 4 bits per pulse need to be generated at a rate of 400 Mbps, leading to several
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tens of gigabytes of random data required for a single pass. For protocols requiring biased basis and
signal choices, this will increase the required generation rate. High speed quantum random number
generators (QRNGs) with suitable SWaP requirements exist, allowing real-time on-the-fly provision
though in-orbit demonstration and validation are still required [59]. A QKD protocol also requires
bidirectional classical communication between Alice and Bob for reconciliation, error correction and
privacy amplification which can be performed by RF communications over public channels.
Acquisition, Pointing and Tracking System: In low earth orbit (LEO), the transmission range varies
from a few hundred km at zenith up to about 2000 km at low elevations. It is therefore crucial to
achieve a pointing accuracy of the order of micro-radians in order to mitigate channel losses. In our
system, pointing is achieved in two stages: coarse pointing and fine pointing.
The coarse-pointing stage is provided by pointing the body of the satellite via ADCS and hence
the rigidly mounted telescope. Fine pointing is provided by a closed-loop beam steering system using
a beacon tracking camera (BTC) and a MEMS micromirror (MM) (Figure 3). A MM is a mirror that
can be tilted independently over the x and y axes. We have chosen a Mirrorcle S40069 [60] that has a
5-mm diameter and can be mechanically tilted to up ±5◦ (optical tilt ±10◦) with step of 1.3 µrad (the
transmission telescope magnification improves this precision by a factor of 30) and is controlled using
a software proportional-integral-differential (PID) controller. The quantum signal and both UL and
DL beacons are co-aligned on the main boresight of the telescope through in-orbit calibration; these
are steered by the MM driven by the output of the BTC. A DL beacon is sent at 905 nm and is coupled
into the beam path by a short-pass dichroic mirror, co-aligned with the 808-nm quantum signal. The
DL beacon also carries a clock signal synchronised with the 808-nm quantum signal pulses, allowing
the optical ground station (OGS) to perform coincidence matching and background event rejection.
The UL beacon—chosen to be at 850 nm—is picked out of the beam path by a short-pass dichroic. The
image of the UL beacon is focused onto the UL Beacon Camera which is read out at up to 1 kHz in the
region-of-interest mode. Preliminary testing indicates that ∼ µrad pointing precision is achievable












Figure 3. Downlink fine-pointing system schematic: A 90-mm telescope collects light from a beacon
on the optical ground station (OGS) and produces a collimated 3-mm beam that reflects off a
micro-electromechanical system (MEMS) mirror that provides beam steering. The beacon light is
separated on a dichroic beamsplitter and is directed towards the beacon camera. The beacon spot
position on the sensor is used as a feedback signal to the MEMS mirror to correct errors in satellite
pointing. The QKD source is coupled into the other arm of the beamsplitter so that the QKD and
beacon beams are nominally colinear and counterpropagating. Due to the rapid transverse motion
of the satellite and the small transmitted beam divergence, a point ahead correction is required. The
DL beacon has been omitted for clarity. A second dichroic mirror combines the DL beacon with the
outgoing quantum signal. This allows the OGS to track the satellite as well as to convey precise timing
and synchronisation information required to pick out the faint quantum signals from background
noise.
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The field of view (FoV) of the UL beacon camera is 5.5 mrad, compared with the telescope FoV
17.5 mrad (Figure 4). Hence, it is simple to scan the entire telescope FoV using the MM beam steering
function for initial acquisition of the UL beacon. In this mode, the beacon spot is simply required to be
guided close to the set point; this can be achieved in the time or order of 1 second. After this has been
achieved, only a small fraction of the camera sensor needs to be read, which speeds up the tracking
loop by up to an order of magnitude.
Figure 4. Fields of view: The telescope has a ±0.25◦ = 4.36 mrad half FoV to match the coarse-pointing
performance of a moderate ADCS system. The effective MM steerable range is ± 10◦30 = 0.33◦. The FoV
of the uplink beacon camera is 1 mrad as this is restricted by packaging constraints of the optical path
and component sizes; in principle, this could be up to ±5 based on the UL beacon pixel array size. The
DL beacon has a divergence of 100 µrad, wider than the 20-µrad beam width of the quantum signal to
ensure that timing and synchronisation are still maintained in the event of temporary fine-pointing
excursion beyond the quantum beam width.
Once UL beacon lock has been achieved by the fine-pointing mechanism, the deviation of the MM
from the neutral position represents a boresight error and this can be fed back to the ADCS to improve
coarse pointing. This would allow the reduction of the required telescope FoV that is diffraction
limited; degraded performance of the outer field is acceptable for initial UL beacon acquisition, and
the use the fine-pointing feedback signal to the ADCS would greatly reduce the coarse-pointing error
so that quantum transmission would be restricted to a central region of the telescope FoV.
The centroid position of the beacon is compared with a set-point. The set-point includes
a point-ahead offset that depends on the transverse velocity of the satellite with respect to the
OGS-satellite line-of-sight (LoS) that can reach a maximum of 50 µrad; this can precomputed as
a function of time during the pass. A correction signal is sent to the MM driver that performs beam
steering so that the UL beacon spot is brought towards the set-point. Our preliminary implementation
shows that the APT systems should occupy no more that 1U.
Transmission optics: The transmission optics is specified as a 30× telescope of 90-mm diameter
(Figure 5). The exit pupil position, where the MM will be placed (back-focus position), and the
size of the rear element should be compatible with the APT system geometry. The telescope should
be athermal for the range of temperatures of operation, nominally 20 ◦C to +30 ◦C, and should be
achromatic over the wavelength range 800 nm to 850 nm. The optics should be polarisation insensitive
along the (transmissive) quantum signal beam path. A maximum volume of 2U is specified for the
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transmission optics; this should be achievable with a reflective or catadioptric design, and its mass
should be below 2kg.
Figure 5. Preliminary payload telescope and beacon camera optical design concept: The 90-mm
diameter 30× afocal catadioptric telescope has diffraction-limited performance between 800–850 nm
over a field of view of ±0.25◦ and is 75 mm long. The MM (fast steering mirror) is located at the exit
pupil to the rear of the telescope. Incoming uplink beacon light is directed to the uplink beacon camera
via a fold mirror, dichroic mirrors and a focusing lens. The dichroic mirrors combine the outgoing
quantum signal and downlink beacon (neither are shown).
In summary, a 6U CubeSat is proposed for the QUARC mission, which comprises approximately
2U of volume for the APT and source, 2U of volume for the telescope system and 2U of volume for
the supporting platform systems. The supporting systems not only must carry out housekeeping
operations such as power management, command and data handling, and telecommunications to
traditional ground stations but also must take care of advanced functions such as coarse pointing via
an ADCS and orbit station-keeping using a propulsion system. Orbit station keeping is required to
maintain precise Earth and Sun synchronisms, without which the repeat ground track characteristics
would quickly be lost, sacrificing targeted coverage over the chosen region. This will be further
discussed in Section 4.
3. Channel Analysis
Losses as well as spurious counts are detrimental for the final secret key rate as it makes the
quantum state less distinguishable [11,61]. In this section, we are going to model the channel between
the satellite and the OGS and to review the source of losses and background counts. The physical
scenario is summarized in Figure 6.
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Figure 13. CQuCoM Concept of Operations. The CQuCoM is a proposal to perform orbit to ground single photon transmission for
distribution of quantum keys and entanglement. A 6 U CubeSat would be deployed from the ISS into low Earth orbit. An artificial guide
star sent from the optical ground station allows the CubeSat to acquire and track the site located at thematera laser ranging observatory,
Italy as it passes close by. A combination of platform pointing and active optics is designed to send single photons from an onboard
quantum source towards the optical ground station. Two launches are proposed as part of the development campaign. The first flight
uses a weak coherent pulse source to test the tracking and pointing system and for BB84 type QKD. A second mission would fly an
entangled source that would allow fundamental tests of quantummechanics as well as E91 type QKD.
of Toronto Institute for Aerospace Studies (SFL). The
field-of-view (FOV) of the quantum receiver optics will
be 0.4 deg, chosen to match the pointing accuracy of the
satellite bus. Thus the payload will not require a fine-
pointing system, which will reduce complexity, mass and
power needs of the payload. Thewide FOVof the receiver
optics does however have the drawback that it will see a
larger footprint of the area around the ground station,
and consequently be more susceptible to background
from light pollution or the Moon. Nevertheless, the link
analysis for the mission shows that assuming a good,
dark location of a ground station, entanglement between
ground and space can be demonstrated, and quantum
key transfer from ground to space can be demonstrated.
The CubeSat quantum communications mission
(CQuCoM) has been proposed by two of the authors
(D. Oi and A. Ling) and an international consortium to
performorbit to groundQKD(Figure 13).27 Thismission
diﬀers from NanoQEY as the quantum signal source
is located in space whilst the receiver is located on the
ground. This mission would test the ability for CubeSats
to point and track ground targets with extremely high
accuracy that is required for space to ground quantum
communications. The quantum transmitter developed
for CQuCoM could be developed into an auxiliary sub-
system for integration into larger satellites, e.g. to secure
command and control of high value orbital assets. A first
flightwould incorporate aWCP source for calibrating the
pointing system and demonstrate QKD. A second flight
would operate an entangled photon source to distribute
entanglement between space and ground and allow fun-
damental tests of quantum theory.
6. Conclusion
The rapid pace of development in both CubeSats and
quantum technologies is leading to exciting possibilities
for combining their characteristics of miniaturisation,
ruggedisation and enhanced capability. CubeSats oﬀer
the possibility of in-orbit experience and space heritage
of quantum components and sub-systems, conversely the
new quantum technologies suggest novel missions for
CubeSats. Development on a host of enabling technolo-
gies, both on the space and quantum fronts, widens the
types of missions that can be considered with smaller
platforms.
Spacecraft sizes fall upon a continuum and there is
both movement to larger CubeSats (up to 20U have
been proposed) and smaller microsats (around 50 kg) so
we should not restrict ourselves unduly to a particular
‘class’. This gives flexibility to envision missions at inter-
mediate cost and development eﬀort that still can ben-
efit from some of the CubeSat advantages (canisterised
deployment,COTScomponents,miniaturised low-power
high capability sub-systems), but with the benefit of
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Figure 6. Quantum channel representation: In modelling the quantum channel, we have considered
various source of losses, spurious counts and source errors, all of which decrease the final secret key
rate.
3.1. Channel Losses
Diffraction: Losses due to diffraction of the transmitted beam over the distance between satellite
and OGS are by far the most import nt losses. The distance depends on the orbital altitude and on the
elevation of the satellite, as seen by the OGS. In this proposed mission, we consider a circular orbit
with an altitude of 574 km; the distance between the satellite and the OGS will thus range between 574
km—at Zenith—and approximately 1500 km at an elevation of 15◦ above the horizon.
The full divergence of the beam is ωdiv = 22 µrad (first minima of the far-field airy distribution
assuming a flat-top transmission intensity). If we denote the transmitter (receiver) aperture with DT
(DR) and with Rθ—the range between the satellite and the OGS for a certain elevation θ—diffraction
loss for a beam propagating in the vacuum is given by the following [62]:




The latter expression implies a quadratic increase of losses with the distance travelled by the optical
beam. We assume a transmitter aperture of 90 mm and a receiver aperture of 700 mm. The
transmitter aperture value is the maximum that can be accommodated in a 6U satellite without
the use of deployable optics. The receiver aperture is comparable to the 600-mm primary mirror
of the transportable optical ground station developed by DLR for downlink optical communication
[63]. Furthermore, commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) 700-mm telescope systems are available from
companies such as PlaneWave [64] that are purposed for satellite laser communications [65].
Atmospheric Losses: The atmospheric losses are due to scattering an absorption from the
atmospheric constituents, and they are relevant only within 20 km from the ground, above which
the atmosphere is extremely rarefied. Atmospheric losses depend on the incident wavelength and,
being linked to the path travelled by light, on the elevation angle. This behaviour is captured by the
following Equation [66]:
TAtmθ = Tλ csc θ, (1)
linking atmospheric losses an elevatio angle. Tλ is the vertical transmissivity, which is dependent
on the signal wavelength and, in the case of 808 nm, is 0.77. The atmospheric transmissivity decreases
to 0.5 at 15◦ elevation [67].
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Transmission Pointing Error. As pointed out in Section 2, an increase in pointing error, αp, increases





In the current simulation, we assume a pointing error of 1 µrad, leading to a transmissivity of
approximately 0.9. Field trial results indicate that this target precision should be possible with further
development of our system. It is worth noting that relaxing the pointing requirement to 5 µrad would
induce 7 dB extra loss.
Turbulence. Turbulence is a major issue for all free-space optical communication as it causes
time and spatially varying regions of refractive index deviations [57]. Light beams can experience
deflection (when the characteristic size of the turbulence is large compared with the beam) and
wavefront aberrations (when the converse is true) passing through these regions. The DL configuration
experiences comparatively little loss due to turbulence compared with the UL configuration, the
so-called shower curtain effect. This is because the DL beam experiences turbulence-induced deflection
and aberrations only over the last 20 km of its path when its size is much larger than the turbulent
eddies; its centroid is thus not going to be displaced significantly. UL beams suffer 10–20 dB more
turbulence-induced loss by comparison, as any deflections induced at the start of their path cause
large errors at the position of the satellite [51,52,57].
Optics Efficiency. Absorption for the transmitting optics can be pre-compensated choosing a
suitable laser intensity as we assume that the satellite is not under the control of a third malicious party.
As for the receiving optics, in a standard BB84 setting, a received photon will traverse two beamsplitter;
we assume a 50 % transmissivity per optical element.
Detection Efficiency. We assume the use of conventional Si-avalanche photo-diodes (APDs) with
standard 40 % quantum efficiency (QE); this value is consistent with that of COTS devices, and this
could be improved by using superconducting nanowire single photon detectors (SNSPDs) but at
greater expense and SWaP, albeit on the ground [68].
In Figure 7, the total channel loss against the elevation angle is plotted beginning at 15◦. Total
losses range from approximately 47 dB to 35 dB.
Figure 7. Total losses against elevation angle at 808 nm: This was obtained assuming transmitter
and receiver apertures of 90 mm and 700 mm, respectively; beam divergence of 22 µrad; zenith
transmissivity of 0.77; pointing error of 1 µrad; optical element transmissivity of 50%; and detection
efficiency of 40%. The orbit altitude is assume to be 574 km, and the orbit choice is discussed in Section
4.
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3.2. Spurious counts
Spurious counts are due to electronic noise (dark counts), stray light coming either from the sky or
from the environment surrounding the OGS, and polarisation basis errors. The former two sources can
be reduced by time filtering the detection counts to narrow coincidence windows around the expected
time of arrival of the signal pulses. Assuming a 1-ns gating window and a repetition rate of 100 MHz,
we have a 1/10 suppression factor for dark counts.
Detector dark counts: The dark count rate (DCR) of a Si-APDs detector is estimated to be 50 counts
per second. This can be improved by using SNSPDs.
Stray light: The stray light contribution to spurious events can also be mitigated by passive
spectral filtering; a 1-nm filter (commercially available) effectively eliminates stray light in a rural
setting, though it is not as effective in urban areas. Narrower, 0.05-nm filters are also feasible and can
in principle enable daylight operation [45]. The Doppler shift of a satellite in LEO is of the order of
0.02 nm; hence, narrower filters would not be suitable unless they could be spectrally tuned during the
pass to follow the Doppler shift.
Assuming only nighttime operations and a moonless sky, we have a background count rate on
the order of 103 counts per second [69]. This may increase by an order of magnitude in the case where
a full moon is in the FoV of the OGS.
Polarisation Basis Error: the transmitted and received polarisation bases may be misaligned, leading
to detected counts in the wrong channel. We assume a misalignment of 5◦.
4. Mission Design
A satellite constellation is proposed, which offers QKD communication through regular,
time-critical passes over locations of interest: in this case, the UK. In order to ensure regular coverage
without the need for excessive numbers of spacecraft, a Sun and Earth synchronous orbit is proposed.
This type of orbit benefits from both consistent illumination conditions over the long term from its
Sun synchronism and repeat ground-track properties from its Earth synchronism. A propulsion orbit
station-keeping system is required to ensure that such an orbit will be maintained for the duration of a
mission. In addition, since a consistent satellite altitude is preferred over the course of the mission, a
circular orbit is proposed. Satisfying all of these conditions limits the orbital combinations of altitude
and inclination, and for the purposes of the QUARC mission, a repeat ground track after 1 day and 15
orbits is selected. This is achieved with an orbit altitude of 574 km and an orbit inclination of 97.68◦.
Constellation Topology. The number and orbital positioning of spacecraft for this mission dictates
the level of coverage, which impacts the revisit rate to gateways and thus the communication capacity
(ability to transfer data). For example, a single spacecraft would be capable of passing over the UK at
most three times per night, with varying levels of elevation above the horizon depending on gateway
location. This would not, however, directly translate into multiple key transfer opportunities per
night for each gateway due to the fact that communication can only take place between a single
satellite–gateway pair at any one time. Therefore, a greater number of spacecrafts would be required
to ensure coverage of a greater number of stations, with multiple visits per night. Furthermore,
populating multiple orbit planes would enable a distributed revisit schedule over some required
period.
In order to obtain regular coverage over the full nighttime period, a constellation of 15 satellites
in five orbit planes is proposed and evaluated (Figure 8).
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Figure 8. Illustration of satellites (black dots) in the five orbit planes: Note, three of the satellites are
out of view in this image, over the far side of the Earth.
The satellites are separated in-plane (difference in true anomaly, TA) by 25◦ such that passes
overhead of a particular ground location occur at intervals of 6 minutes 40 seconds for each of the
three-satellite clusters. The orbit planes are separated (difference in Right Ascension of Ascending
Node, RAAN) by 30◦, which ensures that direct overhead passes occur at 2 hour intervals. Passes
with a lower elevation above the horizon, relative to each of the gateways, occur during the orbits
preceding and following the overhead pass such that a total of 45 passes are experienced per night
from this constellation. A summary of the orbit parameters is shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Constellation topology parameters.
Attribute Value Unit Comment
Orbit Synchronism Sun & Earth - To ensure regular, repeat coverage
Orbit altitude 574 km -
Orbit inclination 97.68 degrees -
Orbit eccentricity 0 degrees Circular, to ensure even coverage
No. orbit planes 5 - -
No. satellites 15 - I.e. three satellites per plane
In-plane separation (TA) 25 degrees Separation between satellites in plane
Cross-plane separation (RAAN) 30 degrees Separation between planes
The overhead passes are designed to occur at a local time of approximately 20:00 hrs, 22:00 hrs,
00:00 hrs, 02:00 hrs and 04:00 hrs (Figure 8). E.g., the first satellite to pass directly over the UK each
night (in the eastern-most plane) should do so early on in the night, while the final satellite to pass
directly over the UK (in the western-most plane) should do so in the early hours of the morning. A
plot of the elevation angle relative to a point approximately in the centre of the UK (latitude 51.507◦,
longitude −0.128◦) over time is presented in Figure 9, in which the data for each satellite triplet are
represented by a different colour and the data for each satellite within each triplet are represented with
either a dotted line (first to pass), a dashed line (second) or a continuous line (last in the triplet).
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Figure 9. Elevation angle over a central UK gateway for a typical night (time 0 = 18:00): Each colour
represents a triplet of satellites (one triplet in each orbit plane). Line-styles represent each satellite in
the respective triplets.
Approximately 12 hours after the nighttime ascending passes, there will be a set of associated
descending daytime passes, which, while of limited value from a QKD perspective, could offer
opportunities for data transfer over traditional (RF) methods of communication. The subsatellite point
locations and footprint in which each satellite would be visible is shown in Figure 10 at a time of
00:06:40 hrs.
Figure 10. Location of subsatellite points and coverage footprint shortly after midnight.
5. QKD System Performance
True single-photon sources are not a mature technology, yet [70,71], the vast majority of QKD
implementations use faint laser pulses. The Poissonian photon statistics of coherent pulse makes them
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vulnerable to the so-called photon-number-splitting attack. This is where an eavesdropper performs a
weak measurement, selectively blocks all pulses containing a single photon and only resends those
containing more than one photon, thus allowing them to have a perfect copy of the exchanged key.
This attack can be counteracted by using decoy state methods [72,73], where pulses with different
average photon numbers are randomly sent and are used to estimate channel transmissivity and to
detect eavesdropper activities. The asymptotic key rate and the quantum bit error rate (QBER) are
given by following expressions respectively:






Y0/2 + edet(1− e−ηL(θ)µ)
Y0 + 1− e−ηL(θ)µ
. (4)
where Rr is the repetition rate (100 MHz), q f is the basis reconciliation factor, fe is the error correction
efficiency, H2 is the binary entropy, Qµ is the signal gain (the ratio between the number of events
detected by Bob and the number of signals emitted by Alice), Q1 and E1 are the estimated gain and the
error rate for single photon pulses respectively, and L(θ) is the loss as a function of the elevation. In
what follows, we are going to consider the following parameters: Y0 = 10−5 for the probability of a
dark count, edet = 3.3 % for the error linked to the stability of the optical system and η = 0.4 for the
detection efficiency. We also consider signal state and decoy state mean photon numbers per pulse of
0.5 and 0.1, respectively. We have chosen fixed values for the intensities; the optimal values depends
on the channel conditions but might be hard to compute on the fly. We will leave such optimization as
well as the analysis of statistical fluctuation on the key rate for futures works.
QKD requires LoS with a ground station in order to carry out communications; the rate of secret
key rate is dependent on the range between the two terminals. As such, in order to maximise key
exchange, it is desirable to communicate with ground stations that are directly under the flight path of
the satellite: the Zenith condition. This is not always possible due to the nature of orbital mechanics,
such that an understanding between the key rate and satellite elevation above the ground terminal’s
horizon is useful in order to improve the amount of exchanged keys. In a perfect visibility scenario,
i.e., no disturbances from the cloud, the following key rates are possible at a wavelength of 808 nm as
a function of elevation angle (Figure 11).
Figure 11. Rate of secure key exchange as a function of elevation.
Ground terminal passes reach various maximum elevations throughout a mission such that
the actual number of secure keys exchanged will vary. These are calculated numerically during the
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simulation, and the key rate (K˙) in bits per second (Figure 10) can be approximated as a 3rd-order
polynomial of the elevation angle (θ), using the following equation:
K˙ = −0.0145θ3 + 2.04θ2 − 20.65θ + 88.42. (5)
In order to present a real case scenario estimation, we need to consider cloud cover [74], which, if
present along the LoS between the spacecraft and ground terminal, prevents any signal transfer.
In order to estimate the probability of LoS between the satellite and gateway, sunshine data is
used as a proxy for cloud cover [75]. The primary benefit of this, over direct cloud cover, is that it
can be considered a more representative analogy of LoS due to the fact that it is also a measure of a
space-borne signal arriving at a ground-based sensor. The data, obtained from the UK Met Office,
provides daily averages for the number of sunshine hours at all locations across the UK at a resolution
of 5 km × 5 km [76]. This is provided as an average for each month of the year such that daily or even
hourly insights are not obtained. This temporal resolution means that it is not possible to consider
different cloud formation effects, e.g., a probability of 50% that the sun is shining does not differentiate
between patchy cloud cover over the whole month, complete overcast for half the month and clear
skies for half the month, or something in between. The practical implication of this is that these
different scenarios will have a different impact on the QKD operations.
Based on an understanding of the day length at various points throughout the year, derived
using sunrise and sunset times, it is possible to estimate the average cloud-cover fraction for a specific
location. For example, if the time between sunrise and sunset is 12 hours for a certain location in a
certain month and the average daily sunshine hours is 6, it can be inferred that there is, on average,
50% cloud cover at that location. It is assumed that this cloud cover approximation remains the same
during nighttime hours.
In order to represent the effect of cloud cover on the mission performance, the transfer of keys is
modelled such that the key rate is reduced by a fraction equal to the expected level of cloud cover, i.e.,
a 50% cloud cover will lead to a 50% decrease in the volume of key exchanged. This can be considered
a best-case scenario in terms of performance, given that a patchy cloud coverage would impact the
performance more than a simple block cloud-coverage scenario.
The time of sunrise and sunset varies significantly throughout the year, and the variation is
latitude dependent. The northerly gateways will receive longer dark periods during the winter months
and shorter dark periods during the summer months compared to their southerly counterparts. It
should be noted that, for the purposes of QKD transmission in this work, sufficient “darkness” is
considered to be the time between civil dusk and civil dawn, i.e., when the sun is below the local
horizon (elevation angle of less than 0◦).
6. Mission Analysis and Results
Analysis of the QUARC mission has been carried out in order to understand the level of
performance that could be achieved by a satellite constellation providing QKD services to a UK-wide
network of ground-based gateways. Performance, in this case, is defined as the volume of secure key
data that could be transferred between the satellites and gateways per night. Figures of merit have
been derived that offer insights into the performance for both an individual gateway and a network of
gateways. Specific results are provided for the hypothetical gateway network, defined in Section 1,
but the methods introduced here could be applied to understand performance of a different set of
gateways.
The primary performance metric being investigated is the amount of secure key data that can
be exchanged between satellites and gateways, as a function of the gateway location and the number
of satellites in the constellation. Assuming that more key information is generally better, we would
naturally aim for this; however good performance is more complex than this, depending on the
objectives. For example, it might be the case where the maximum number of exchanged keys is
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achieved when a large number of keys are exchanged between a small number of ground terminals and
satellites; however, a more uniform spread of keys might be desirable across the network. Alternatively,
should specific terminals have higher priority than others, it may be preferable for those terminals
to receive more keys. This level of detail is application specific, such that the analysis here is kept
intentionally generic. A uniform priority is assumed therefore, such that resource is distributed to
gateways according to their relative availability.
Performance will be captured for each gateway (j) as a measure of the volume of shared key
information per night for each month of the year (k). This is calculated as part of the simulation defined





where xj is the average volume of secure key data transferred per satellite per night to gateway j via a
constellation of n satellites. This is based on the assumption that communication can only be between
a single satellite–gateway pair (i.e., the satellite cannot transmit data to more than one gateway at any
one time) and assumes that the influence of each satellite in the network on each of the gateways is
similar. This latter assumption is considered acceptable given the close proximity of the gateways
relative to the field of view from the satellites.
Using the above figure of merit means that, for this particular infrastructure, it is possible to
understand the volume of key data that can be exchanged with gateways at different locations across
the UK for different months through the year as a function of the number of satellites in the constellation.
Indeed, a natural limitation exists due to the fact that there are only so many dark hours during the
night, i.e., the maximum number of keys would be reached should there always be a satellite available
for key transfer.
As well as the number of satellites in the constellation (n), the number of gateways being targeted
(m) has a significant impact on the performance for each gateway independently. To generalise the
problem, the relative transfer volume (maximum theoretical volume of key data per night) to each
gateway in the network must be considered, such that the respective impact is proportional to this






where vl,k is the volume of data that could be transferred to gateway l during month k per satellite
in the constellation. For example, consider a network of three gateways to which a key transfer
capacity is considered as the potential to transfer data. For example, for a satellite that experienced two
opportunities to transfer data to a gateway per day over which 20 MB and 10 MB could be transferred,
respectively, the daily transfer capacity between these two nodes would be 30 MB. Ten, 5 and 0 per
satellite per night can be attributed, respectively. Given a constellation of three satellites, gateway 1
would expect to receive 13.3 units per night, gateway 2 would expect to receive 3.3 units and gateway
3 would receive none. Effectively, this assumes that the available satellite resource is distributed to the
gateways in a manner that is proportional to their respective potential transfer volume.
6.1. Model definition
Analysis of the QUARC mission performance (secure key transfer capacity) has been achieved
through execution of a high-level numerical simulation model in combination with illumination
and cloud-cover modelling (Figure 12). The simulation model considers the relative position of each
satellite–gateway pair and outputs the elevation angle above the horizon for each step in the simulation.
The simulation has a time-step duration of 10 seconds and represents 12 hours of real-time operations
(between 18:00 hrs and 06:00 hrs).
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Figure 12. Simulation work flow.
The simulation results are combined with a sunrise–sunset model for the 15th day of each month
of the year to establish the rate of key transfer during each gateway pass and the nominal (clear sky)
satellite–gateway secure key volume transfer capacity. This nominal key volume capacity for each
monthly 12-hour period is scaled according to the expected level of cloud cover (e.g., 50% cloud cover
would scale the key volume for that period by a factor of 0.5).
The result of this analysis process is an expected secure key volume per satellite per gateway
location for each month throughout the year and is illustrated in Figure 13.
Figure 13. Key exchange during a typical January (left) and April (right).
6.2. Single Gateway Results
The results shown in Figures 13 and 14 illustrate the volume of secure key transfer to each gateway
per night per satellite in the constellation for the months of January, April, June and September. It is
important to note that these results show a hypothetical scenario for each gateway independent of all
the others, i.e., assuming no other gateway is demanding satellite resource. This enables an insight
into each gateway’s relative capacity.
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Figure 14. Key exchange during a typical June (left) and September (right).
From the above results, the variation in performance between different locations over the year
is not straight forward. It is a complex coupling of dark sky duration, expected cloud coverage
and satellite visibility. In general, the volume of secure key data transfer is greater during spring
and autumn than in summer and winter. This can be attributed to significantly longer days in the
summer months and significantly greater cloud coverage during winter months. Some locations
exhibit uncharacteristically good performance compared to their surrounding regions, such as the east
coast of Scotland (Lat 56◦, Lon −3◦) during the month of September.
6.3. Scaling for a specific gateway topology
In the case where all 43 hypothetical gateways are demanding of resources from the 15 satellites,
the resources are modelled as being shared according to each gateway’s data-transfer capacity. Results
are presented, again for January and April (Figure 15) and for June and September (Figure 16), showing
the volume of secure key data that would be expected at each of the gateway locations per satellite in
the constellation. Of course, in reality, operational requirements might demand a different distribution
of resources, such that this approach can be seen as one particular use case.
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Figure 15. Mission total key exchange during a typical January (left) and April (right).
Figure 16. Mission total key exchange during a typical June (left) and September (right).
While similar trends are seen in the results shown in the previous section, the variability
in the transfer capacity is exaggerated due to the provision of data-transfer resources relative to
communication capacity. This should be expected since more resources are applied to the gateways
with greater transfer capacity in order to maximise the data transfer during times of high availability.
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6.4. Time scale and budget considerations
COTS 700-mm aperture telescope systems for satellite optical communications are available
for USD 200K [64,65]. With additional costs for the quantum receiver hardware and housing
structure, a single OGS should cost less than USD 500K. The cost for the QKD ground segment
could be considerably reduced by colocating SatQKD and conventional satellite laser communication
infrastructure, i.e., utilising the same telescope for both operations. The main areas of payload
development are source miniaturisation, ruggedization and security hardening; timing and
synchronisation systems; thermal design and analysis; design and manufacture of transmission
telescope optics; and space-qualified software. A reasonable time scale for the development of this is
24 months given sufficient resources, and we envisage a recurring cost per CubeSat of around USD
500K (USD 300K platform, USD 100K optics and USD 100K other payload systems).
Launch costs are variable depending on whether a suitable rideshare opportunity into the desired
orbits is available. Conservatively, we will assume a dedicated launch on a small rocket such as Rocket
Lab’s Electron which can put 220 kg into Sun synchronous orbit for USD5M [77]. The cost to deploy
the constellation can thus be conservatively evaluated at USD25M assuming five separate launches,
placing three 6U CubeSats into each orbital plane. Considering the capacity of the electron launcher
(220 kg) and taking into account deployment container mass, each launch could place up to 15 6U
CubeSats per orbital plane, which would greatly increase constellation capacity and would provide
in-orbit redundancy. Alternatively plane-change manoeuvres could be achieved through raising or
lowering the orbit altitude and by relying on a shift in right ascension of the ascending node through
Earth’s oblateness effects. While this approach is cost effective regarding launch, it requires time
and propellant and adds an additional risk to the mission success. Once development is concluded,
the deployment could be achieved in about 12 months (6 months assembly, integration and test of
the payload/satellite, together with 6 months for integration with the launch vehicle and launch
operations). These time and budget estimates indicate that a CubeSat constellation for QKD is in reach
and can be developed within the framework of currently available technology.
The above results provide insights into the amount of secure key data that can be transferred
to a UK-based ground network via a 15-platform CubeSat constellation. Indeed, operational and
geographical constraints will play a significant part in real-world performance, which should be
considered carefully in future studies. This can only be evaluated fully on a case-by-case basis, but the
general approach and figures of merit defined in this work should offer a good starting point.
7. Conclusions
In this work, we have analysed the QUARC mission concept for a nanosatellite constellation
to provide the UK with a satellite-based QKD capability. Due to the relatively low cost of CubeSats
compared to traditional, large satellite platforms, deploying a large number of platforms may offer
greater coverage which would mitigate some of the risk associated with performance limitations linked
to cloud cover. Satellite constellations will also offer greater flexibility than a single platform when
it is required to accommodate the communication demand of the underlying gateway network.
Satellite-based QKD for securing critical infrastructure is of current interest with the launch of
the EC-ESA Quantum Communication Infrastructure (QCI) initiative [78] that will require a space
segment for continental-scale secure networks [79]. The UK is also pursuing CubeSat-based efforts
to accelerate SatQKD as part of the National Quantum Technology Programme [38], and QUARC
provides preliminary mission and performance analyses that will inform future developments.
An example mission topology has been presented, which includes a ground network of 43
gateways (to represent a large UK-infrastructure project) and a 15-satellite constellation. The satellites
are placed into 574-km circular orbits, which are both Sun and Earth synchronous in order to ensure
good coverage over the UK and consistent passes at useful times overnight.
A QKD payload and its performance have been modelled and tested to provide input for the secret
key rate as a function of elevation. We have chosen trusted node QKD in order to reflect near-term
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realizability. Conservatively, we have assumed nighttime operation only. Operation during twilight
hours may be possible with a reduction in key rate, thus extending the times at which key distribution
could be performed.
In order to evaluate the secret key volume, we have developed a comprehensive channel
simulation incorporating orbital propagation for the satellite constellation, twilight duration, losses,
spurious event source as well as historical weather data. Our results show that a CubeSat constellation
has the potential to deliver a small but reliable amount of secret key that could be used in
scenarios where highly secure communication is required, such as critical infrastructure management.
Performance at specific gateway locations is shown to be highly dependent on geographical position
and seasonal conditions. It is found that, in general, southern regions offer a more consistent long-term
average rate of key transfer but with isolated regions further north benefiting from long overnight
dark periods and minimal cloud cover during some winter months. The mission analysis results
presented offer indicative levels of performance for gateways distributed across the UK; however, it is
recommended that mission-specific analysis be carried out for different topologies [42].
Furthermore, our finding suggests that payloads optimised for operation with high background
levels of light may be beneficial to extend coverage at high latitudes during the summer months,
e.g., 1550-nm operation and aggressive temporal, spatial and spectral filtering. A shift toward 1550
nm would be also desirable in order to implement intersatellite links [43–46]. This may however
compromise peak key distribution rates; hence, further studies will be needed to perform optimisation
across payload and mission parameters coupled with a detailed key-demand and network-usage
model including key buffering and refresh rates.
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ADCS attitude determination and control system
APD avalanche photo-diode
AOI area of interest
APT acquisition, pointing and tracking
BTC beacon tracking camera
COTS commercial, off-the-shelf
DCR dark count rate
DL downlink
FoV field of view
FSM fast steering mirror
LEO low earth orbit
LoS line-of-sight
MEMS micro-electromechanical system
MM micro-electromechanical system micromirror
OGS optical ground station
PID proportional-integral-differential
QBER quantum bit error rate
QE quantum efficiency
QKD Quantum key distribution
QRNG quantum random number generator
QUARC quantum research CubeSat
RF radio frequency
SatQKD satellite quantum key distribution
SNSPD superconducting nanowire single photon detector
SWaP size, weight and power
UL uplink
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